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• On the Way to a New Monetary
Union: The European Monetary
Union
OOKING BACK IN HISThRY over the last two
centuries, we will find only a few cases of a
successful creation of a monetary union but a
far larger number of cases which failed. As far
as the final goal is concerned, it means having
only one single currency for all the nations in
the European Union and replacing the individual
national currencies; it is a very big undertaking.
It means that one has to create a monetary un-
ion ultimately encompassing nearly 400 million
people and a region which would have the
highest gross domestic product (GDP), the most
extensive foreign trade, and so on, in the world
In other words: It is an ambitious goal which
has not yet been reached, but we are on the
way to reaching it.
11. •MONEIflHY• UNION: IN THE
FGINI. I1.NU
The goal of a monetary union must he seen as
one specific objective along the road from the
European Community (EC) created by the ‘meaty
of Rome in 1957 and the European Union shaped
by the ‘meaty of Maastricht which was ratified
in 1993. The long way we have come from the
beginning to the present state of the European
Union is impressive; this holds true not only of
the progress made but also of the time span
which has been necessary to make it, and it has
not been without a number of crises, set-backs
and periods of stagnation
From the beginning, the way went along the
economic integration of the national economie-
sin direction of a single European economy But
the real target was a political one. This was very
clear at the outset The first step was the crea-
tion of the European Coal and Steel Community
in 1952. At that time, three politicians were of
particular importance: Robert Schuman, Alcide
de Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer. It is worth
remembering that these three statesmen all
came from border regions, between France and
Germany or between Italy and Gerinan-speaking
Austria. Schuman and de Gasperi were both
bilingual, that is, they spoke French and Ger-
man, and Italian and German, respectively
Adenauer came from the western banks of
the Rhine River and was, to a certain extent,
French-oriented. These three mcii, who had all
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experienced the two big wars in Europe be-
tween the nations which actually belonged so
close together, had the courage to create this
European Coal and Steel Community as the first
Community organization. To a certain extent,
coal and steel were considered to be the most
important strategic materials. In Germany at
that time, the production of such materials was
limited and under the control of the Allied
Forces. Later, the production of these materials
came into surplus and lost its particular- strateg-
ic importance. But the Coal and Steel Commnuni-
ty, which exists even today, fulfilled the role of a
nucleus foi the development of the European
Common Market.
The subsequent steps towards the European
Community should he well-known. I mean the
creation of the Community of six nations, West
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium
and Luxembourg, in 1957. ‘I’he next important
step was the extension of the Community to in-
clude the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and
later Spain, Portugal amid Greece. At the begin-
ning of 1993 the target to create a so-called sin-
gle market had been reached. Since that time,
no government harriers have been in place be-
tween the member countries as far as the trade
in goods amid services is concerned, as well as
the movement of labor and capital. After the ex-
tension of the Community from six to 12 coun-
tries, the so-called deepening of the Community
had reached an important point.
Now, Europe is on the brink of doing both: an
extension of the Community to include new
memhers comprising the Scandinavian countries
and Austria, and the deepening on the way to a
monetary union. Even now, the primary target
is a further su-engthening of the economic in-
tegration. It means achieving a large, single mar-
ket for the western and central European
countries and, at the end, to use only one cur-
rency in that market.
But one should not forget that the taiget even
now is political. It should bring the European
countries with a rather- stable democratic consti-
tutions closer together and allow them to de-
velop into a political union. The end of the Cold
War has given them more fi-eedom to do so. Be-
foie that, Austi-ia and Finland, in particulao had
to take caie not to provoke the Soviet Union.
The development of free and democratic socie-
ties in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary





From the beginning of the EC there were
differences in the attitudes in the various coun-
tries, especially in France and Germany, as fat’
as the role of monetary policy in the economic
integration was concerned. The dispute was
seen as a conflict between ‘monetarists’ and
“economists,” which means something different
in St. Louis. The “monetarists” helieved that
monetary integration has to start first and that
economic and political integration would follow.
The “economists” believed that economic conver-
gence between the national economies must oc-
cur before any move into very close monetary
integration amid a monetary union.
At the end of the 1960s and the heginning of
the 1970s, the “monetarists” gained stronger- in-
fluence. An EC Community study, the so-called
Werner Plan, described a step-by-step introduc-
tion of a monetary and economic union. But the
first step under this plan, that is, the obligation
to have fixed hut changeable exchange rates be-
tween the national currencies, was i-ather uti-
successful. The times were characterized by the
end of the Bretton Woods system, and later by
the first oil price hike and a world-wide reces-
sion in 1975. Only the core of hard-currency
countries were ahle to stay togethei- without in-
terruption, specifically, Germany and the Bene-
lux coumitries.
The real reason for the failure of this first at-
tempt to have a system of fixed but adjustable
exchange rates for all countties was the strong
deviation in the mates of inflation. Between 1973
and 1979, for instance, the annual rate of infla-
tion was 11 percent in France and 16 percent in
ltah~but only 41 percent in Germany. For the
Federal Repuhlic of Germany, however, this was
the highest i-ate of inflation in a medium-term
average in four decades. The heavily engaged
politicians in this field were following the doc-
trine of the so-called monetarists: Giscard d’Esta-
ing in F’rance and 1-lelmut Schmidt in Germany
tried to hase the integration in the monetary
field on a sti-onget- institutional platform than
before. They created the European Monetary
System (EMS), 5%-hich came into effect in March
1979 and is practically existing up to now. I do
not think it is unfair to explain the common in-
terest of the French president and the German
chancelloi, d’Estaing and Schmidt, respectively,5
apart from vet-v important poimits, with one
common motive: The dominance of the deutsche
mark was of particular concern for Giscard and
the dominance of the Bundesbank seemed to he
a big concern in the eyes of Helmut Schmidt,
even though this was riot actually true.
The EMS was constructed as a system of fixed
hut adjustahle exchange rates between the EC
countries, which allowed fluctuations of these
exchange rates only within a relatively narrow
band. And which, secondh~established a large
framework of partly unlimited credit facilities
for the member central banks. This credit
mechanism was to niake it possible to keep the
exchange rates stable, even under strong pres-
sures on one particular currency, through the
obligation of central banks to intervene in the
foreign exchange markets, if necessary, with un-
limited amounts.
THE- INHERENT WEAKNESS OF
THE’ EMS
Looking back, the creation of the EMS was a
very important step towards a European mone-
tary union at a later date. It worked in two
directions. First, all countries learned what is
possible under given conditions in Europe and—
where necessary—how these conditions had
to be changed. Second, all member countries
learned that a fixed exchange rate can stimulate
the integration of trade and other transactions
across the borders of the member countries of
the Community. We observed that the member
countries felt a systemic pressure to try to
orient their own domestic development, especial-
ly as far as the price developments were con-
cerned, to that of the best-performing countries.
‘faking the same countries which I have men-
tioned before, for- the period from 1979 to 1990,
we can see that the annual increase of prices in
France then was only 6.9 percent, compared to
10.7 percent in Italy and 2.9 percent in Germany.
The inflation rate differentials had diminished,
arid the average rate of inflation in the EC s~’as
lower In the veal-s after- 1990, these differences
were smaller still arid partly the other way
around.1
But we also experienced that even those
smaller differences—whenever they existed over
a longer period of time—create a need for a
change in the exchange rate structure. In other
words, they result in the need for a realign-
ment. If one counts exactly, we have had 16
bigger and smaller realignments since 1979,
namely 11 between 1979 and 1987, but there
were no gener-al realignments up to September
1992, the rest later. This seems to be a relative-
ly good experience of a system of fixed ex-
change rates aimed at achieving a convergence
of the economies.
But even in the period from 1987 to 1992,
price differentials accumulated, with the conse-
quence that those countries which kept their
nominal exchange rates stable experienced an
increase in their real exchange rates. Italy, for
instance, recorded a real appreciation of its cur-
rency vis-~-visthe deutsche mark and other
hard currencies in an amount of nearly 15 per-
cent between 1987 and 1992, and the same was
more or less true for the pound sterling. Such
real appreciation leads to a loss of the competi-
tive position of a country, and it depresses its
exports and the overall domestic situation. The
latter is aggravated by the fact that it becomes
necessary to increase the interest rates in these
countries far above the level in the hard-
currency countries, The solution to eliminate
these tensions was not ideal: The United King-
dom and Italy withdrew from the ERM in au-
tumn 1992.
These events show the real weak flank of a
fixed exchange rate system. To avoid these
events, a realignment would have been neces-
sary at an earlier stage, a devaluation of the
more inflationary currencies vis-~-visthe rather
stable currencies, that is, the deutsche mark,
the Dutch guilder, the French franc, and so on.
But realignments are highly political affair’s—at
least the politicians have made them into that.
Mv long-standing experience with this—reflected
by Oscar Wilde, svho wrote: “Experience is the
sum of the failures”—is that realignments are
made only under the strongest pressure in the
foreign exchange market, not on the basis of
any profound backward and foi-ward-looking
analysis. This was also the case in the Bretton
Woods system arid one of the reasons why it
broke down. In other words, this is the inherent
weakness of the EMS on to be more precise, of
any system with fixed but adjustable exchange
rates.
‘See Fischer (1994).b
One solution to ease the problem—having a
change of the exchange rates but not necessari-
ly a political decision about a realignment—was
found by widening the band of fluctuation of
the exchange rates. This was done in August
1993 by widening this band to ±15percent, in-
stead of ±2.25percent arid ±6percent, respec-
tively. In fact, since we have had this wider
hand, the exchange rates of the EU countries
have been behaving rather calmly. No country
was forced, or prepared, to use the wider band
for a stronger devaluation or revaluation. Each
country now has a clear responsibility for its
own currency and for the exchange rate of its
currency. In my opinion, this is a rather good
basis for further developments on the way to a
European monetary union. After a longer peri-
od, in which the exchange rate structure of the
EMS currencies would have come into a longer-
lasting equilibrium, the fluctuation band could
he diminished somewhat.
Ti-IF’ CONCEPT OF THE ECONOM-
IC ‘INI) MONE-TARU U.N1ON (EMU)
The ‘meaty of Maastricht, called the ‘freaty on
European Union, the most important extension
of the ‘meaty of Rome, is rather clear about the
different steps needed for a monetary and eco-
nomic union, but rather vague concerning the
elements of a political union, that is, a common
foreign policy, defense policy, harmonization of
laws or social policy. By the way, a new inter-
governmental conference is to take place in
1996 to implement the political part of the
Union. Coming back to my ear’liei remarks,
however, the Treaty of Maastricht contains more
of the ideas of the “monetarists” than of those
of the “economists?’ But this type of victory was
easier to reach than anything in the purely po-
litical field. A monetary union means that all
member countries have to give up their national
sovereigrity in this area. It means monetary un-
ion fir-st and political union later A monetary
union is a sacrifice of sovereignty for each
country. And, as French President Mitterand
said before the referendum in France in 1992,
the biggest sacrifice is in Gem-many, the country
with the anchor currency in the EMS and,
therefore, the country with the monetary policy
that is most independent from the policies of
the other member countries. Having said this,
lios-vever, I should add that (;ermanv has never
been completely independent from the others in
the past and that it has usually had to take into
consideration the consequences of its own poli-
cy decisions for the partner countries. But,
nevertheless, this has been done on its own
judgment.
In the other political areas, the national
sovereignty is not given up. There are some limi-
tations, some common rules, some Community
directives, but there is no direct interference,
for instance, in foreign policy decisions. Even in
the case of fiscal policy, the national govern-
mnents are sovereign. They agreed to a process
of multilateral surveillance and they agreed in
the Maastricht ‘meaty on some soft sanctions for
misbehaving countries, but each state decides in
full sovereignty on its own taxation system and
on tax rates and public expenditures. Of course,
some rules have been formulated, but only for
the public sector deficit and for the level of
government debt. Agreement on common Euro-
pean foreign and defense policies is very difficult
and can be seen in the i-ole which the European
Union played—or did not play—in the break-
down of the Yugoslav Republic and the conse-
quences that followed.
Having said this, the monetary union described
by the Maastricht Treaty is not an illusion. It
takes into account many of the experiences
gained in the EMS period, and it proclaims a
path toward the EMU in three stages. Stage I
means freedom for international capital move-
ments; this is given now. It also calls for mem-
bership in the EMS, preferably in the ERM,
but—as I have said before—the latter is riot yet
given for all countries. For example, the United
Kingdom, Italy and Greece are not in the ERM.
Stage hi started at the beginning of this year. It
includes the establishment of a European Mone-
tary Institute (EMI) as the forerunner of EMU
and the European Central Bank. The Institute
has started with its work and now definitely has
its seat in Frankfurt, the financial center of Ger-
many and the place where the Bundeshank has
its bieadquarters. The EMI has to clarify the
technical arid operational questions for the corn-
ing European Central Bank; it has to continue
and intensify the coordination of the monetary
policies of the member’ countries and it has to
control the EMS and the development of the
ECU.
In the final stage, the heads of state of the Eu-
ropean Union will meet and decide if RN-lU can
start, in 1997 or 1999. This decision is to he
made on the basis of which countries fulfill the
crflri,ni nrcrzcn,r flASii( or crr rso-called entry criteria. This will he a very im-
portant exercise. The Treaty gives indications of
how to proceed in this process of examination.
‘they have to clarify which countries have
enough and sustainable price stability, have
sound puhlic finances, and have no strong ten-
sions as far as the exchange rates of their par-
ticular currencies are concerned.2
The ~~rpose of this examination is to ensure
that only those countries which fulfill these
criteria can join the EMU at the beginning,
thereby guaranteeing that only countries with a
sound economic basis can he founding mem-
bers. This means also that, at the beginning,
presumably not every member country would
qualify for- membership in EMU. In other wor-ds,
the ‘meaty opens the way for a two- or three-
speed solution. Those countries which are not
in EMU at the beginning can come in when
they fulfill the entry criteria. ‘I’he United King-
dom and Denmark, however, have the i-ight to
stay out under any circumstances, even if they
fulfill the criteria.
I think the idea of entry criteria can be consi-
dered a “victory” on the side of the “economists;’
on paper at any rate. One cannot for-get that the
fioliticiaris will have a certain degree of discre-
tion in their final judgement about which coun-
try should join the EMU and which should not.
By the way, the room for discretionary assess-
ment is strongly hinited for the German govern-
ment, because the Gernran Par-liament as well as
the Federal Constitutional Court ar-c forcing the
government to be very strict in its judgements
in this. Nevertheless, it is a highly political issue.
Everyone knows it cannot he solved solely on
the basis of statistics, and even the interpreta-
tion of the statistical cr’iteria is now umidei’
dispute.~
In my opinion, the ‘meaty of Maastricht is a
rather well-balanced document. The question is
whether this concept can be filled with real life
and whether this life could satisfy the wishes
and hopes which many are connecting with it.
If I were to try to give an answer as far as the
whole content of this new European Union, the
political Union, is concerned, I would have to he
ver vague. I would have to start with the ques-
tion of whether the nations are prepared to give
up their’ identities. Are they prepared to for-get
the experience s-vhicli they have had with each
other during for the past hu.rndreds of year’s?
Can they give up whatever judgments and
prejudgments they may have made and—
especially—can they forget all the injustices they
have inflicted on each other?
Other open points are the consequences of
widening the European tJnion from 12 to 16
states, and what consequences would he for
opening for membership for the central Europe-
an states, that is, Hungary (which has already
applied for membership), Poland, the Czech
Republic, and so on. All these are important
questions and riot really new. More than 35
years ago in Germany, Ludwig Erhard, the
Minister of Economics who contributed so much
to the “German revival” (Henry Walhich, 1955),
was strongly engaged in the European debate.
Even then, he was against a Europe of only six
countries. He published an advertisement in
newspapers, writing only:
6 + 7 + 5 = 1.
He meant that six alone would riot comprise one
Europe; the seven EFTA countr’ies and the rest
of the non-communist countries in Europe
should be included. In 1995, presumably 16
countries s-vill form the European Union—only
Switzerland and Iceland will be missing to corn-
plete the Erhard formula.
I do not want to go into this grand design of
European questions, even if I have indicated that
I have always been inclined to he on the side of
Ludwig Erhard. Let me come back to the ques-
tion as to how a European Monetary Union can
function. The center piece of the EMU is the es-
tablishment of the European Central Bank, the
only central bank which could issue the single
iSes: “Protocol on the Convergence Criteria Referred to in
Article 109i of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity?’ Office tor Official Publication of the European
Communities (1992).
3For instance, “price stability” is given if a member state
has an inflation rate not more than 1.5 percentage points
higher than “the three best-performing member states?’
The question is, does it mean the average of these three
states or that of the worst (or the best) of these three
states?
r$~v,rnrr~jrr 100,~0-
European cur’rency In many respects, this Bank
will be modeled on the Geinnan Bundeshank,
which means that it will have the priority target
of keepinig the value of the currenc stable and,
for that purpose, it will:
* he independent from the national and supra-
national governments (not accepting orders
nor being allowed to ask for any);
• have a Centr-al Bank Council consisting of the
governors of the national centr-al banks and
six members of an executive boar’d who can-
not be dismissed during their term in office
for decisioni-niaking;
• he granted the necessary instruments for
monetary policy, that is, open man’ket policy,
interest rate policy, minimum reserve require-
ments, if necessary, and so on; and
• the European Central Bank will not primarily
he responsible for banking supervision, but it
is possible to transfer’ corresponding tasks to it.
I ENTHAL /)r,y!~p%~GOALS ANI)
utJ()f%’:)i:’i’.:%FfV M:GREGA’I’ES
As I have already mentioned, the monetary
union is ivell constructed on paper and a Euro-
pean Central Bank could syork. The European
Central Bank is to he established as a federal in-
stitution, tnuch like the Bundeshank in Gerniany,
which has the federal elements of the tJnited
States as its “grandfather;’ so to speak. Why
shouldl it not be possible for such an institution
to fulfill its tasks for Eur-ope? Many people are
asking whether snrch a new central hank com-
prisirig people froni differ-em countries with a
somewhat chfferent ‘‘cnnlture’’ of monetary policy
could really work. I have to answer that mone-
tary policy decisions are never made on the ha-
sis of a full conformity of opinions among the
decision makers. This is not the case in the Cen-
tial Bank Council of the Bundleshanik with its 16
members, nor is this the case in the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal
Reserve System, as we can all see from the
record of policy actions. Both Councils are
democratic institutions in which decisions are
made through majority, hut certainly these insti-
tutions have a basis of a common attitude, and
have a certain consensus about what to dlecide
and how to work.
Take the U.S. case. David Mulhins, the former
vice chairman, says that 4 percent inflation is
unacceptably high. And Wayne Angell, a long-
standing member of the Board of Governors,
wrote in his letter of retirement to the President
of the United States that “I am pleased... [that]
the Board of Governor’s was enunciating a goal
of zero inflation. But if the quest for’ price-level
stability is replaced by an acceptance of an infla-
tion n-ate stabilized at say 2-1/2 percent per’ year;
then we are accepting the fact that the domestic
valnre of the dollar’ will he cut in half every
generation, 28 years?’ Thus, there is a consen-
sus, with some room for interpr’etation, between
both (ex-)members.
In the Gernran case, the Bundeshank is some-
times attacked because part of its intermediate
monetary target—the growth of M3—is derived
on the basis of a so-called unavoidable increase
of about 2 pci-cent in the price level. Presuma-
bly, Wayne Angell would also be a little bit dis-
appointed about this.
Which price level target will the European
Central Bank formulate, if it were to formulate
one at all? The 1.5 percentage points over the
average of the best-performing countries cannot
be a target, it is the entry criterion. Up to now,
there seems to be no discussion about a piice
stability target for this future Central Bank. The
core countries would presumably agree on a
figure like that of the Bundeshank, and—if that
were done—one would be also in agreement
with Professor Stanley Fischer; who recently
wr’ote “that anyone should lie comfortable with
a 1-3 percent target’~
I do not want to go into the details of the use
of a declared price stability target. Canada and
New Zealand are using one, and have indeed
reached and kept to it up to nosy. It is worth
noting that the last Governor of the Bank of
Canada, whose bank was successful, had to re-
sign when a new gover-miment came into power.
Price stability targets in the sense of a stable
consumer price level are a very ambitious exer-
cise. So fat; New Zealand’s central bank keeps it
at 0-2 percent inflation, even against opposition.
Nobody would he sur-prised—especially riot at
the Fedleral Reserve Bank of St. Louis—if I were
to suggest that thie Emrropean Centr-al Bank should
start immediately with targeting on the basis of
a money supply target. I must admit that this
would lie rather complicated at the beginning,
because nobody could know exactly bow the Eu-
ropean money supply, the money demand func-
tion, amid so on, will behave. But, in my opinion,
rFnrrrrA, RFFIFRVF RANK OF ST r fltrrsit is indispensable that this new central bank
has an idea of how strongly the money stock
should grow and, especially, of how far the
monetary basis should be extended, the money
which this new European Central Bank System
will create itself. ‘This question reminds me of
the fact that after- the deutsche mark had been
introduced in 1948, the military government
prescribed that any additional increase of cur-
rency in circulation, exceeding a total circulation
of 810 billion, needed a very restricted proce-
dure of agreements by a three-fourths majority
of the Central Bank council and had to be ap-
proved by the Lander Governments. This
was a primitive way of control, but it made
clear that any extension of money must be limit-
ed, especially if it is a new nroney, which does
not inspire the same confidence at the begin-
ning than a well-proven old currency
The discussion of whether or riot to have
money supply tar-gets will be a point of con-
troversy in the EMI. The President of the EM1,
Baron Lamfalussy (1994), has formulated the
different positions that will presumably be held,
for example, using the money supply as an in-
ten’rnediate target, as is practiced in Germany
and some other countries. Or, having no inter-
mediate target hut a concrete price stability tar-
get, such as New Zealand. Or neither’ of them,
which he seems to prefer—reading between the
lines—by saying “can one not use monetary ag-
gregates at least as an information variable?’~
This seems to be a new for-mula which was
described, for instance, by Benjamin Ftiedman
(1994). 1 find this new label sounds good hut I
have to add that such eclecticism, as a mnatter of
fact, is riot new. I think that advanced central
banks follow the development of the money sup-
ply aggregates everywhere arid at all times, be-
cause they value the information that monetary
aggregates provide and their importance to the
economic developments, but the)’ also take other
tactor-s into account.
CO.N:CL/CSiON~s
When the EMI has completed its work of
preparrng the future European Central Bank,
when the examination of the entry criteria has
been made and the breads of state of the Euro-
pean Union have decided that the monetary Un-
ioni can start, then the adventure will begin. At
the beginning, only the exchange rates between
the differ’ent national currencies of the member
countries have to be fixed without any margin
and without any possibility of changing them in
future. In a later’ stage, the single currency can
replace these national currencies: This would be
the fulfillment of the European Monetary Union.
It may seem to you that the way to EMU is a
relatively long one, that many preconditions
which have been formulated give the inipression
that the fathers of this program ar-c themselves
not sure about the success of the whole plan.
And you could add that Europe needs too much
time to find solutions comparable with the dy-
namics in the United States. But even here in
the United States, it took quite a long time be-
fore you got a Federal Reser’ve System, even
though one currency existed. Now, in Europe,
we have central banks. In quite a number of
our countr-ies we have currencies which are
relatively stable arid we have a situation in
which the exchange rates are no longer fluctuat-
ing very strongly, although they could. In other
wom-ds: ‘rhe integration of the economies in Eu-
rope and, especially, in the European Union can
and will continue to progress toward more com-
plete economic integration. For this purpose, it
is not so impomtant—either for our countries or
the rest of the world—whether the European
Monetary Union starts in 1997, 1999, or even a
little later-. What is decisive is that we replace
the different European currencies with a single
currency that is as stable as the best-performing
national currencies.
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